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THE PLACE OF AESTHETICS IN ZONING
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how "aesthetics" fits into
the law of zoning. This problem has been dealt with to a large extent in
recent years by various legal journals' and, being still in controversy, de-
serves more attention at this time. Before going into any discussion of aes-
thetics, it will be necessary to analyze the legal basis of a municipality's
right to zone, such legal basis being the police power. This analysis will il-
lustrate the nature, the application, the influencing factors and the scope
of the police power in the law of zoning. As this concept is developed, it
will be noted that "aesthetics" does have a place in zoning but that all
"aesthetic" situations do not properly fit into that place. The discussion of
"aesthetics" itself will encompass its connection with the police power, its
legal sufficiency, its legal meaning, its application to varying situations, and
its role in the future.
A city, in the exercise of its police power, has the authority to enact a
zoning ordinance only when such an ordinance is reasonably necessary for
the preservation of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. In
1926 the Supreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance cre-
ating a residential district, excluding such establishments as apartment
houses, business houses and retail stores was a valid exercise of the police
power.2 The exclusion of such places of business from residential districts,
according to the court, "'is not a declaration that such places are nuisances
or that they are to be suppressed as such, but it is part of the general plan
by which the city's territory is allotted to different uses, in order to pre-
vent, or at least reduce, the congestion, disorder, and dangers which often
inhere in unregulated municipal development.' " In other words, the pur-
pose of the ordinance was for the public safety and the ordinance was
therefore a valid exercise of the police power.4 Notice, however, that once
1 For discussions on aesthetics in the law of zoning see Agnor, Beauty Begins a
Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962); see also
Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of People v.
Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1963); see also Comment, Aesthetic Control of Land
Use: A House Built upon the Sand?, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1964).
2 Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3 Id. at 392.
4 However, the use of such power must not be applied in a manner unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory; see Stevens v. Stillman, 18 Misc.2d 274, 186
N.Y.S.2d 327 (1959), in which an ordinance prohibiting the establishment of a trailer
camp in an agricultural district was found to be arbitrary and therefore not justified
under the police power; but see Fass v. City of Highland Park, 321 Mich. 156, 32
N.W.2d 375 (1948), where it was held valid to confine the activity of killing, dressing
and selling live poultry to a certain zone within a city because such an ordinance has
a distinct relationship to public health.
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a zoning regulation is adopted, the legis;lative judgment is of validity
treated as conclusive until it is adequately contested. This rule is exempli-
fied by a case where the plaintiff's land was zoned for commercial use, as
opposed to industrial use.5 Even though industry was allowed nearby and
the plaintiff's land had diminished in value due to that ordinance, the ordi-
nance was upheld because to change his land to an industrial district would
create a traffic hazard and congestion, thus3 depreciating the value of sur-
rounding dwelling houses in a predominantly residential area.0 In con-
testing the ordinance, the plaintiff failed to prove by clear and affirmative
evidence that such legislation did not promote public health, safety, mor-
als, or general welfare, thereby losing his case.7 Thus zoning laws do deny
property owners the freedom to use their property as they desire, unless
such laws can be set aside on the ground that there is no proper foundation
within the police power.
When deciding whether a particular zoning law is valid, the courts seem
to have been influenced by such factors (where applicable) as: (1) exist-
ing uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) destruction of property val-
ues; (3) relative gain to the public as compared to hardship to the individ-
ual property owner; (4) suitability of the property for the purposes
zoned;8 and at times, (5) the motivation behind the restriction, that is
whether the restriction is founded primarily on aesthetic considerations. 9
The factor of aesthetics will be dealt with at great lengths later in this
article. A particular case may involve any number of factors, and at times
new considerations are made. In an Illinois case, the plaintiff sought to
have an ordinance which zoned his property as residential declared in-
valid. The court examined most of the factors stating that "the zoning
ordinance ignored the intermixed character of the neighborhood, sur-
rounding uses, the traffic situation, and the highest and best use of the
property . . . ,"0 and that there would be little to gain to the public by
5 Rams-Head Company v. City of Des Plaines, 9 Ill. 2d 326, 137 N.E.2d 259 (1956);
see also Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 II. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1957).
6 Id.
7 In another case, a property owner successfully contested a zoning ordinance which
classified his property for office building uses only, rendering such property practically
useless. So long as this ordinance would have remained in effect, the plaintiff could
not have built a shopping center like those in adjacent areas, even though the plaintiff's
property was completely surrounded by land zoned for commercial purposes. The
court held the ordinance invalid because the plaintiff clearly showed such a restriction
to be discriminatory. Pearce v. Village of Edina, 2631 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962).
8 National Brick Company v. County of Lake, S, Ill. 2d 191, 137 N.E.2d 494 (1956);
see also Bauske v. City of Des Plaines, 13 Ill. 2d 169, 148 N.E.2d 584 (1958).
9 Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 DicK. L. REv. 109 (1963).
10La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook, :2 Ill. 2d 40, 45, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68
(1957).
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limiting such property to residential purposes at a great loss to the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff won the case on the ground among others that, as simi-
larly situated property was otherwise classified, the ordinance was dis-
criminatory." Such cases bring out the point that in determining the
validity of a zoning ordinance under the police power, the courts have
weighed all the factors involved before coming to final conclusions.
Recent authorities have argued that zoning needs an enlarged scope of
police power. As Professor Yokley wrote, "In the complexity of our mod-
ern life, there are so many factors closely connected with the health, safe-
ty, and convenience of the community that police power regulations of
great scope are increasingly upheld .... 12 Early in the growth of munici-
pal zoning a court stated that the "quiet and the presence of natural sur-
roundings and even vegetation, on account of its production of oxygen,
may be important elements in preserving health.' 3 In a more recent case,
a party brought action to restrain a village from enforcing an ordinance
against signs projecting from the face of buildings over any sidewalk or
street. The plaintiff was not successful because aesthetic reasons are at
times valid reasons to sustain such legislation. 14 The court reasoned that
"our cities and villages should be beautiful and that the creation of such
beauty tends to the happiness, contentment, comfort, prosperity and gen-
eral welfare of our citizens."'15 This type of ruling, however, was rarely
made in early cases and, as will be noted in the forthcoming paragraphs,
either has not been accepted by certain courts or has not been applied by
others to varying factual situations.
Should the police power be employed to achieve an aesthetic end? In
order to answer that question, it is essential to determine if "aesthetics" is
reasonably necessary for the preservation of public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. In 1931, a court inferred that a plaintiff's property was
included in a residential district for the primary purpose of providing a
beautiful and dignified village frontage on the public thoroughfare. 16 The
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but stated that perhaps aesthetics
"need not be disregarded in the formulation of regulation to promote the
11 Id.; see also Langgath v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 5 I11. 2d 49, 124 N.E.2d 879 (1955),
in which the court held that since the plaintiff's lots were not very desirable for resi-
dential purposes and that since the use proposed by the plaintiff would do minimal
damage to other property in the neighborhood, the ordinance prohibiting business use
was invalid.
12 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 21 (1953).
181d.
14 Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1940).
15 Id. at 1019, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
1 6 Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
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public welfare [however] no judicial definition has been formulated which
is wide enough to include purely aesthetic considerations.' 1 7 Other fact
situations, however, have allowed the aesthetic consideration to be made in
a different manner. In one such situation, the plaintiff brought a suit to
have certain laws, adopted by the town cf Concord, Massachusetts, re-
stricting outdoor advertising upon private property within public view,
declared void. The court observed that the preservation of scenic beauty
"from defacement promotes the public welfrare and is a public purpose,"'18
and then said: "Even if the rules and regulations of billboards and other
advertising devices did not rest upon the safety of public travel ... , we
think that the preservation of scenic beauty and places of historical inter-
est would be a sufficient support for them. . ".."19 A similar situation was
handled in a slightly different manner in 1953 when the defendant was
convicted of displaying signs in a certain section of New Orleans in viola-
tion of an ordinance limiting the area and illuminating character of signs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the convicticn by stating that perhaps aes-
thetic considerations alone would not be valid, but here this legislation is
in the interest and benefit of the inhabitants of New Orleans generally.
The court reasoned that the preserving of the section was not only for its
"sentimental value but also for its commercial value, and hence it consti-
tutes a valid exercise of the police power .... -20
This later case leads to a discussion of property values in the problem of
applying aesthetics. As early as 1923, a case was heard which considered
this matter. The ordinance in controversy prohibited the construction of a
business building in a residential area. The court stated that beauty and
fitness enhance values in public and private structures, and thus do pro-
mote the general welfare, but that there should be reasonable limitation to
such application of the law.21 Again in 1945, values of neighboring prop-
erty were considered in applying aesthetics;. The court would not permit
a property owner to remove top soil from a vacant lot in a residential area
to the point that the land was left valueless because the effect of such
waste would be to depress values of other lands in the neighborhood; thus
aesthetic considerations "are in themselves entitled to some weight along
17 Id. at 230, 177 N.E. at 430; see also Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324
Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949).
18 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
184, 193 N.E. 799, 816 (1935); appeal denied, 296 U.S. 543 (1935).
19 Id. at 187, 193 N.E. at 816; see also 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 20 (Cum.
Supp. 1964); but see, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Parks,
202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
20 New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 29, 64 So. 2d 798, 803 (1953).
21Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
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with other considerations" 22 in determining the reasonableness of town
zoning ordinances. An even later case which followed the decision in the
famous Berman v. Parker23 case was State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland. 24 Here the plaintiff brought an action to command a
village building inspector to issue him a permit to erect a residence build-
ing in a desirable residential community consisting principally of single-
family dwellings. The inspector acted according to an ordinance which
allowed the issuance of a permit only when the village board was satisfied
that "the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the proposed
structure will, when erected, not be so at variance with.., the structures
already constructed or in the course of construction in the immediate
neighborhood .. .as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property
values .... 25 The ordinance was upheld on the grounds that "the protec-
tion of property values is an objective which is within the exercise of the
police power to promote the 'general welfare,' "26 and it is immaterial
whether the ordinance is based on such aesthetic values with or without
any of several other possible legitimate objectives. So, it can be said gen-
erally that aesthetic considerations can stand alone, but only where such
factors as fit the situation in a particular case can be construed as being
within the realm of the general welfare of the community.
In reality then, it is difficult to say that an aesthetic consideration alone
would be upheld as a valid exercise of police power, because, as shown in
the previous paragraphs, there has been some other factor, such as prop-
erty value, present in the relevant decisions of the past. A much-quoted
statement appeared in Perlmutter v. Greene where the court said: "Beauty
may not be queen, but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection
or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, moral-
ity or decency. '27 In this case, a public officer in charge of highways in
New York erected a large screen to block the view of a billboard by pass-
ing motorists. The plaintiff's action to remove the screen was dismissed on
the grounds that dangers to travel on the highways arise from diverting
the attention of motorists from the road by billboards, and the fact that
considerations of an aesthetic value also exist does not negate this factor of
22 Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 222, 61 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1945); cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945).
23 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see later discussion regarding aesthetics and urban redevelop-
ment, at note 65.
24 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
25 As set out in the opinion, id. at 265, 69 N.W.2d at 219.
26 Id. at 270, 69 N.W.2d at 222.
27 Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932); see generally, Agnor,
Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962).
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public safety. With each decision more weight has been given to aesthet-
ics; however, a zoning ordinance has not been supported purely for aes-
thetic reasons. 28 It follows then in relation to the validity of a zoning law,
aesthetic considerations are not wholly without weight and may be taken
into account where other elements are present to justify regulation under
the police power.29
Usually, aesthetics will only play an auxiliary role in testing the validity
of zoning laws. Typical of this is the reluci:ance of courts to use it when
other considerations are available. For instance, back in 1928 so-called
"setback ordinances" existed which required that auxiliary buildings such
as garages and stables be placed upon the rear half of a lot. With regard to
these ordinances one court stated that "such an arrangement may make for
better conditions of light and air, and [tend] to reduce fire risks [and]
promote the safety of public travel over what it would be if a garage
opened directly onto the street."30 The court went on to say that such an
ordinance is not rendered void because it "also has an aesthetic value [or]
that such aesthetic quality was a part of the inducement for making the
regulation." 31 Another example of the courts' reluctance to use aesthetics
as a basis appeared when an ordinance excluded advertising signs from a
retail-store district, and was upheld because it is the "right of a city to
classify its territory into use zones, under a complete [and comprehen-
sive] zoning ordinance [so as to promote] the public convenience, com-
fort, prosperity and general welfare. '32 In giving consideration to these
questions, the court recognized that such laws "may be motivated in part
at least"33 by aesthetic considerations. One court placed aesthetics in an
auxiliary position because, among others, aesthetic considerations are "a
matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is neces-
28 This is exemplified by the case of the property7 owner who was denied the right
to construct a 44 foot radio tower in an exclusive residential area. Aesthetically such
a tower would be an eyesore to such a community and would not conform to the
character of the neighborhood, but as the court mentioned such considerations alone
would not justify the exercise of police power. The ordinance was upheld however
because in addition to the aesthetic consideration two other factors existed, that of
the danger of children climbing on the tower and. the effects of the proposed tower
on property values, and thus the ordinance was within both the public safety and the
general welfare. Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488, 144 N.E.2d 381
(1957); appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 1046, 152 N.E.2d 420 (1957).
29 See Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952).
30 Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253, 259, 141 At. '42, 145 (1928).
31 Ibid.
32 Criterion Service, Inc. v. City of East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County, 1949); aff'd mem., 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E.2d 475 (1949).
33 Ibid.
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sity alone which justifies the exercise of police power. '3 4 A reason sug-
gested for this reluctance is that " 'while public health, safety, and morals,
which make for the public welfare, submit to reasonable definition and
delimitations, the realm of the [aesthetic] varies with the wide variation of
tastes and culture.' "s Restrictions, as some courts would say, should not
be based on "the aesthetic sensitvities of the Village authorities"3 6 as in
"adherence to [aesthetic] concepts of some municipal planning commis-
sion. "87
Certain courts, however, have not expressed any reluctance, and mainly
have been concerned with maintaining beautiful communities so as to at-
tract tourists. In these "Miami Beach" cases, aesthetics play a major role in
establishing the validity of zoning laws. One court said that it is "difficult
to see how the success of Miami Beach could continue if its aesthetic ap-
peal were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure
to the winter traveler." 38 Another Florida court some twelve years later
came to basically the same conclusion by saying that the attractiveness of
communities like Miami Beach and the one across the bay where the plain-
tiff's property was situated is "of prime concern to the whole people and
therefore [affect] the welfare of all." 39 Aside from the motivation of tour-
ist attractions, the "concentration of population in urban areas has forced
a readjustment in our thinking respecting some of our former concepts in
zoning [and with] ever-increasing frequency, the courts lean more favor-
ably toward a consideration of [aesthetics] as a major factor in the enact-
ment of zoning ordinances under the police power. '40
There are many instances where aesthetics do play a major role, but be-
fore going into that matter, understanding what is meant by aesthetics is
34Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 1319, 78 N.W.2d
843, 848 (1956); see also City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign
Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 Atl. 267, 268 (1905), from where this quotation
was originally taken; see generally, 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (cum. supp.
1964).
35 City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 324, 321 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1959); see also
58 AM. JUR. ZONING § 30 (1948); cf., Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513
(1921).
36 People v. N.Y. Central Railroad Co., 5 Misc. 2d 232, 236, 165 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881
(1956).
37 Pearce v. Village of Edina, supra note 7, at 569, 118 N.W.2d at 670.
38 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 487, 3 So. 2d 364, 367
(1941).
39 Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1953).
401 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 14 (cum. supp. 1964); see also Annot., 58
A.L.R.2d 1327 (1958); see generally, 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING,
11-31 (1964).
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important. Aesthetics has been defined as te "doctrine or philosophy of
taste [which is] the science of the 'beautiful, as distinguished from the
moral, or useful, '41 or, in legal terminology, the consideration of beauty
as a motivating factor to justify the exercise of the police power in enact-
ing zoning regulations. 42 An aesthetic person might condemn a store build-
ing within a residential district as an alien thing or as marring its architec-
tural symmetry, or on the other hand might regard such a store as a
convenience.43 An important case in the development of aesthetics in zon-
ing is State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans.44 Here an ordinance
excluded a retail grocery store from a residential neighborhood. In up-
holding the ordinance, the court defined aesthetics by stating that if "by
the term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard merely for outward
appearances [and] good taste in the matter of the beauty of the neighbor-
hood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying that such
a consideration is not a matter of general welfare. ' 45 The court's reasoning
for applying aesthetics was that the beauty of the neighborhood is for the
comfort and happiness of the residents, arnd it sustains the value of the
property in the neighborhood, and is thereby within the realm of the gen-
eral welfare and police power. This application helps to understand the
reason why aesthetics in law is not only one's taste regarding beauty, but
also such tastes as it relates to the general welfare. 46
Aesthetics has played a major role for zoning in such areas as:
(1) restricting the use and the construction of buildings,
(2) preserving the historic character of a neighborhood,
(3) regulating the placement of billboards,
(4) controlling the use of land abutting the highway,
(5) curtailing business operations, and
(6) supporting urban redevelopment projects.
Buildings have been restricted as to single family dwellings, 47 minimum
41 Id. at 16.
42 See Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11
J. PuB. L. 260 (1962).
43 Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
44 154 La. 271, 95 So. 440 (1923).
45 Id. at 284, 97 So. at 444. 46 Agnor, supra note 42.
47 Even though the property owner could only use her twenty-two room, seven bath
house as a single-family residence, the court upheld such a restriction by stating that
the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a community is a proper element
of the general welfare and that the preservation of property values is a legitimate
consideration. Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
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amount of floor space,48 maximum amount of height,49 and uses to which
it is put, 0 but such restrictions all have some relation to the public health,
safety, or welfare as opposed to relying "exclusively for the purpose of
gratifying and cultivating aesthetic tastes."' 51 The public interests involved
could consist of the conservation of property values, lessening of conges-
tion in the streets, prevention of overcrowding of population, and the
preservation of attractive homes and home surroundings.5 2 The preserva-
tion of attractive homes is related to the general welfare because the
"beauty of a residential neighborhood is for the comfort and happiness of
the residents and it tends to sustain the value of property in the neighbor-
hood."5 38
Preserving the historic character of a neighborhood has been defended
by the courts on the grounds that preventing "eyesores" in the locality
was within the general welfare, 54 that "educational, cultural and economic
advantages" would be gained by the public,55 and that "scenic beauty" at-
tracts tourist trade which is vital to the economy of the area.56
Aesthetic considerations in connection with regulating the placement of
signboards "cannot be divorced from material and economic factors [in
that] the presence of signboards near property may definitely affect its
value and the comfort of those who may be living upon it,"5 7 and there-
fore such regulation is within the police power.
48 Such a restriction has been upheld on the grounds that in addition to maintaining
public health and safety, it was designed to conserve the value of the buildings in
the community. Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. 1948).
4 9 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
5 0 See Town of Lexington v. Governar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936), where
a suit was brought in equity by a town to enjoin an attorney from the use of his resi-
dence as a professional office and from the maintenance of a sign so indicating the
practice of law. The town won its suit on the grounds that the flow of professional
clients to homes would change the essential character of the neighborhood which
would tend to take away from the attractiveness of a community and thereby reduce
the value of the residences; see also Connor v. City of University Park, 142 S.W.2d
706 (Tex. 1940).
51 Federal Electric Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 398 Ill. 142, 147, 75 N.E.2d 359,
362 (1947); see also Frischkorn Construction Co. v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d
209 (1946).
B2 Connor v. City of University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1940).
53 Town of Lexington v. Governar, supra note 50, at 36, 3 N.E.2d at 22.
54 City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
55 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
56 Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961) (advisory opinion);
see also City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., supra note 38, and Merritt v. Peters,
supra note 39.
57 Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 297, 40 A.2d 177, 179 (1944).
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Controlling the use of land abutting a bigbway is usually authorized in
connection with the public safety in that :;uch regulations are "intended
to provide clear visibility at street corners and . . . driveways ... ; to re-
duce distractions to motorists and pedestrians; and to provide greater op-
portunity for access in the event of fires."' 5-3 However, even if such regu-
lations have no relation to safety, they can sometimes be sustained as an
attempt to preserve the appearance of a community and the value of its
property. 9
Curtailing business operations has been related to junk yard operations,60
amusement concessions, 61 and garbage dumping.62 Ordinances restricting
such operations are valid when the primary consideration for the enact-
ment is the substantial promotion of public health, safety, comfort, or gen-
eral welfare, and "considerations of taste and beauty may also enter in,
and be not out of place."63 An example of this application is an ordinance
requiring automobile junk yards to be fenced, upheld on the grounds that
its purposes were "to protect passersby from the dangers inherent in the
dismantling and/or storage of wrecked and junked automobiles . . ., and
also to protect children who are naturally attracted to such 'nuisances,' ",64
and was therefore for the public safety.
In supporting urban redevelopment projects, aesthetic considerations
have made their greatest advance. The court, in the famous Berman v.
Parker6 5 case which concerned a slum clearance project, said that the
"concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive [and can] determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled,"66 and consequently
58 People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 240 N.N.S.2d 734, 736 (1963); see also Perl-
mutter v. Greene, supra note 27.
59 Id.; The decision in People v. Stover upheld an ordinance, which prohibited the
use of clotheslines or other devices for hanging clothes in yards abutting the street,
on the grounds that such a restriction preserved the residential appearance of the city
and its property values by proscribing conduct wh!ch "offends sensibilities" and "tends
to debase" the community and thereby reduce real estate values; see generally, Ander-
son, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of People v. Stover,
15 SYAcusE L. REv. 33 (1963).
60 See Delmar v. Planning and Zoning Board, 19 Conn. Supp. 21, 109 A.2d 604 (1954);
see also City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La. 651, 8 So. 2d 156 (1956).
61 See Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion, 3 N.J. Super. 222, 66 A.2d 40
(1949).
62 See Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959).
63 City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La. 651, 654, 39 So. 2d 156, 157 (1956).
64 Id. at 656, 89 So. 2d at 158.
65 Supra note 23; see also Bowker v. City of Worcester, 334 Mass. 422, 136 N.E.2d 208
(1956).
66 Berman v. Parker, supra note 23, at 33.
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held that aesthetic considerations could be used in fixing a public purpose
to support the power of eminent domain. This treatment of aesthetics did
not come as a surprise because the courts "had given a limited recognition
to aesthetic considerations many times before [and this decision] was a log-
ical development in the expansion of the concept of the general welfare in
the exercise of the police power."6 7 The reasoning in this case "was to
become a guidepost in short order for courts anxious to break away from
old ideas that had rejected the concept of [aesthetics]. ' 68
The trend in applying aesthetics to the law of zoning has been recog-
nized as follows:
As the concept and definition of "public welfare" has expanded, so, too,
regard for aesthetic considerations has been more hospitably accepted as having
ing a growing consideration in the philosophy of zoning.
Earlier, frowned upon, then somewhat more willingly taken into consider-
ation, now accorded a place-not alone or by itself sufficient, but a recognized
factor in the equation-aesthetic phases have won a more friendly acceptance
in the determination of the reasonableness and in the upholding of challenged
zoning regulations. 69
So far, however, the courts have not reached the point where aesthetic
considerations alone may justify the use of the zoning power. Even in the
most recent decisions, it was demonstrated that the aesthetic consideration
must tend to promote the public welfare in some manner such as maintain-
ing the property values of the community,70 sustaining the economy of
a state,7 ' or providing safety measures for a neighborhood.7 2 It is difficult
to foresee the courts going any further by declaring that aesthetics alone
can sustain a zoning ordinance. If such a declaration were made, contro-
versies would have to be resolved in an arbitrary manner because not ev-
ery zoning commission or expert in the field will agree as to what consti-
tutes aesthetic ideals.73 Since the police power cannot operate in an
arbitrary manner, there would then be no legal basis for restrictions
founded purely on aesthetics. All that can be said at this time is that aes-
thetics, as the law now stands, will uphold a zoning law only when such
considerations involve other factors that will reasonably promote the pres-
ervation of public health, safety, morals or general welfare as applied by
67 Agnor, supra note 42, at 278.
08 2 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (cum. supp. 1964).
69 2 METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 1577 (1955).
70 See Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, supra note 47.
71 See Opinion of the Justices, supra note 56.
72 See People v. Stover, supra note 58.
73 POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN T14E U.S., 89 (1961); see generally, 2 Yokley,
op. cit. supra note 68.
